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Breard v. Greene
118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998)
I. Facts
On April 14, 1998, the United States Supreme Court denied the petition for
an original writ of habeas corpus, the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint,
the petitions for certiorari, and the corresponding stay applications filed by Angel
Francisco Breard ("Breard") and his native country of Paraguay.' That same
evening, at approximately 9:00 p.m., the Commonwealth of Virginia executed
Breard by lethal injection.
In 1993, a jury convicted Breard of the 1992 attempted rape and capital
murder of a woman in Arlington, Virginia.2 After exhausting all of his state
habeas options with no success, Breard filed a petition for federal habeas relief
on August 20, 1996. For the first time, Breard claimed that the Commonwealth's
alleged violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations ("Vienna
Convention")3 warranted a reversal of his conviction and sentence.' Under the
Vienna Convention, a citizen of one country who is arrested in another country
is given the right to contact the country's consul, and consequently the consul is
allowed to visit the detainee and provide assistance.' The district court found
this claim to be procedurally defaulted with an insufficient showing of cause and
prejudice for the default.6 After the Fourth Circuit affirmed this ruling,7 Breard
filed the petition which prompted this opinion by the United States Supreme
Court.
As a result of Breard's conviction and sentence and his subsequent Vienna
Convention claim, the Republic of Paraguay, the Ambassador of Paraguay to the
United States, and the Consul General of Paraguay to the United States brought
1. Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998).
2. Breard, 118 S.Ct. at 1353. The Commonwealth proffered strong evidence regarding
Breard's guilt, specifically a match between semen found on the victim's body and that of Breard's
DNA profile and a match between hairs discovered on the victim's body and those taken from
Breard. Also, the jury heard Breard testify that he killed the victim, but only because he was acting
under a Satanic curse put on him by his father-in-law. Id See Case Summary of Breard v. Pruett,
CAP. DEF. J., vol. 10, no. 2, p. 15 (1998), for a more detailed account of the facts surrounding
Breard's case.
3. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24,1963, art. 36(1)(b), 21 U.S.T. 77,596
U.N.T.S. 261.
4. Breard, 118 S.Ct. at 1354.
5. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 3, 21 U.S.T. at 100-101, 596
U.N.T.S. at 292-94.
6. Brcard v. Netherland, 949 F.Supp. 1255, 1266 (E.D. Va. 1996).
7. Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 620 (1998).
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an action in federal court against certain Virginia officials, claiming that the
Commonwealth violated each of their rights under the Vienna Convention by
failing to notify Breard of his rights under the treaty and failing to notify the
Paraguayan consulate of Breard's arrest, conviction and sentence.' The Consul
General brought an additional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting a denial
of his Vienna Convention rights. The district court found that Paraguay was not
claiming a "continuing violation of federal law" as required by the Exparte Young
exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.' Therefore, the district court held
that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the various actions."' There-
after, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling," and Paraguay peti-
tioned for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.
On April 3, 1996, the Breard case became the focus of an international
inquiry when the Republic of Paraguay commenced an action against the United
States in the International Court of Justice ("ICJ")." Paraguay asserted that the
United States violated the Vienna Convention with its treatment of Breard upon
arrest. Six days later, the ICJ issued an order asking the United States to "take
all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not executed
pending the final decision in these proceedings.... ."3 Additionally, the ICJ
established a briefing schedule for this action, making a November date for oral
arguments most likely. Consequently, Breard and Paraguay filed the various
petitions and motions which are herein addressed. 4
IL Holding
The United States Supreme Court denied the petitions for certiorari filed by
both Breard and Paraguay and held that (1) Breard procedurally defaulted his
Vienna Convention claim by not raising it in state court;' 5 (2) Paraguay could not
8. Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352, 1354 (1998) (citing Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949
F.Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1996)).
9. Breard, 118 S.Ct. at 1354 (citing Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
10. Id (citing Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F.Supp. 1269, 1272-73 (E.D. Va. 1996)).
11. Id. (citing Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998)). See Case
Summary of Breard v. Netherland, CAP. DEF.J., vol. 10, no. 2, p. 15, 17 n.39 (1998), for an analysis
of Republic of Paraay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998).
12. See Application of Paraguay, Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (Par. v. U.S.), <http://www.icj-cij.org/idocket/ipaus/ipausorder/ipausapplcation
980403.html> (Apr. 3, 1998).
13. Breard, 118 S.Ct. at 1354 (quoting Case Concerning.the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (Par. v. U.S.), <http://www.icj-cij.org/idocket/ipaus/ipausorder/ipausordcr09O498.htm>
(Interim Protection Order of Apr. 9, 1998)).
14. Id Breard filed a petition for an original writ of habeas corpus and a stay application as
a means of ensuring compliance with the ICJ's order. Paraguay filed a motion for leave to file a bill
of complaint, referencing the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over actions "affecting Ambassa-
dors ... and Consuls." Id (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
15. Id at 1354-55.
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bring suit against the Commonwealth of Virginia under an exception to the
Eleventh Amendment because the Commonwealth's violation of the notification
provisions of the Vienna Convention had no continuing effect; 6 and (3) the
Paraguayan Consul General had no greater ability to proceed under § 1983 than
his representative country because he was operating only in his official capacity. 7
III. Ana'ysis / Application in Virginia
A. The Procedural Default of Breard's Vienna Convention Claim
In attempting to protect his Vienna Convention claim from a swift demise
under the procedural default doctrine, Breard argued that he had a viable claim
because as an international treaty, the Vienna Convention constituted "the
supreme law of the land" and therefore trumped the procedural default doctrine.
The Court rejected this argument for two reasons. First, the Court cited the
proposition that in international law, unless there is a definitive statement contra-
dicting such, a treaty is applied in a certain State according to the procedural rules
of that State.'" According to the Court, the Vienna Convention itself supports
this premise given the following language: "'[the treaty] shall be exercised in
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State,' provided that
'said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for
which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.""..9 By not making a
Vienna Convention claim in state court, Breard did not exert his rights under the
treaty "in conformity with" either the laws of the United States2" or those of the
Commonwealth of Virginia.2 ' Therefore, the Court found that Breard could not
now raise such a claim at the federal habeas level.
The Court also rejected Breard's "supreme law of the land" argument based
on the holding of Reid v. Covert,' which stated "that an Act of Congress ... is on
a full parity with a treaty, and that when a statute which is subsequent in time is
inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty
null." ' The Court reasoned that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act ("AEDPA"),24 passed nearly thirty years after the Vienna Convention,
16. Id at 1356.
17. Breard, 118 S.Ct. at 1356. This issue will not be discussed further in this case analysis.
18. Id (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723 (1988); Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694,700 (1988); Societe Nationale Industrielle Acrospatialc
v. United States Dist. Court for Southern Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 539 (1987)).
19. Breard, 118 S.Ct. at 1355 (quoting Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note
3, 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 294).
20. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (finding that assertions of error in criminal
actions must be raised first in state court in order to establish a foundation for habeas relief).
21. Breard, 118 S.Ct. at 1355.
22. 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion).
23. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (plurality opinion).
24. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. ]. No. 104-132,
1998]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
constituted such a "subsequently-enacted rule" under Reid. Specifically, AEDPA
states that a habeas petitioner will not be granted an evidentiary hearing on a
claim of a treaty violation if he "failed to develop the factual basis of [the] claim
in State court proceedings. '"S Under Reid, this subsequently-enacted rule of
AEDPA governs any violations of the Vienna Convention. Consequently, the
Court concluded that without such a hearing, Breard could not prove that the
denial of his rights under the Vienna Convention prejudiced him. Breard chal-
lenged this limitation, arguing that his Vienna Convention claims were so novel
as to prevent him from learning of them early enough to raise them in state
court. Even if such novelty existed, the Court opined that the claims would be
barred under Teague v. Lane.
26
In spite of the ultimate outcome on this issue, the opinion contains some
valuable and potentially helpful information for capital defense counsel concern-
ing the procedural default of Vienna Convention claims. First, it is absolutely
imperative that capital defense counsel assert any Vienna Convention claims at
the trial court level in order to avoid the pitfalls of procedural default. Violations
of the Vienna Convention have recently become much more recognized both by
the judicial system and the general public. Whenever counsel takes on a death
penalty case, the nationality of his or her client should be one of the first things
to be determined. If the client is of a foreign nationality, then Vienna Conven-
tion rights may have been violated, providing' the basis for pretrial motions and
objections at trial.
Second, in determining that Breard, without the help of an evidentiary
hearing, could not establish that the violation of his Vienna Convention rights
prejudiced him, the Court offered capital defense counsel an argument as to what
is required to show prejudice in a Vienna Convention claim. The Court stated
that without a hearing, "Breard... [could not] establish how the Consul would
have advised him, how the advice of his attorneys differed from the advice the
Counsel could have provided, and what factors he considered in electing to reject
the plea bargain that the State offered him. 27 Counsel should first use this list
of requirements as a guide to making his or her Vienna Convention claim in both
written and oral form. The factors enumerated by the Court can provide guid-
ance for the showing of prejudice. One or all may be present on the facts of an
individual case. For example, in Breard, though the client's consul may not be
better at explaining the Virginia legal system, the knowledge of the client's culture
and the personal interaction between countrymen may well affect the subjective
110 Stat. 1214. Note that Breard filed his habeas petition after the enactment of AFDPA. Breard,
118 S.Ct. at 1355.
25. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(2) (Supp. 1998).
26. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Reidoffers an exception to default if the claim is novel. Nonethe-
less, if the claim is so novel that it would not be dictated by existing precedent, then under Teague
it would not fall under the exception. See, e.g., O'Dell v. Netherland, 117 S.Ct. 1969 (1997).
27. Breard, 118 S.Ct. at 1355.
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decision to accept a plea agreement. Similarly, for example, we will never know
whether Paraguay could have assisted Breard's counsel in communicating to his
sentencing jury cultural information about the existence and force of a belief that
one was compelled by a Satanic curse.
B. The Application of the Eleventh Amendment to Paraguay ' Suit
In rejecting the actions brought by Paraguay, the Court concluded that
neither the text nor the history of the Vienna Convention afforded a foreign
country a private right of action in the United States' judicial system as a means
of seeking the reversal of a criminal conviction based on a violation of this
treaty." Furthermore, the Court found that the Eleventh Amendment offered
an additional reason why Paraguay's suit would certainly fail. In Prindpaliy of
Monaco v. Misissippi,' the Court, in determining the basic principle of the Elev-
enth Amendment, stated that 'the States, in the absence of consent, are immune
from suits brought against them ... by a foreign State.""'3 " In challenging this
immunity, Paraguay argued that its action survived this principle under an exem-
ption to the Eleventh Amendment enunciated in Milliken v. Bradley.3 In Milliken,
a case involving remedial issues surrounding school desegregation, the Court
crafted an exception to the Eleventh Amendment for situations involving "con-
tinuing consequences of past violations of federal rights."32 Paraguay asserted
that this exception applied to its suit, but the Court disagreed and instead found
that the Commonwealth's disregard of the consular notification requirement
happened well in the past and had no continuing effect.3 The Court reasoned
that, unlike Milliken in which discrimination and inequality continued to pervade
classrooms because of past acts of de jure segregation, Paraguay's suit lacked a
causal link between the violation and any continuing effect.
Should defense counsel be working in concert with a nation offended by
Virginia's violation of the Vienna Convention, three arguments responding to the
Court's Eleventh Amendment concerns may be crafted. First, counsel, using the
Court's own language, should argue that a causal link does indeed exist between
the Commonwealth's past violations of the Vienna Convention and the convic-
tions and death sentences of foreign nationals. By denying an accused foreign
national the assistance of his or her consul at the time of arrest and thereafter,
the Commonwealth prevents the defendant from receiving effective assistance
28. Id. at 1356.
29. 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (finding that a suit to recuperate principal and interest from bonds
issued by a state should be left to international measures instead of being pursued by a foreign
nation in a federal court).
30. Brard, 118 S.Ct. at 1356 (quoting Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,
329-30 (1934)).
31. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).




of counsel and a fair trial. This is but the first of the unjust consequences
stemming from the treaty violation as the defendant is continually denied the
benefits of consular assistance at every stage of the proceedings. Each day the
defendant sits on death row is a continuing consequence of the Commonwealth's
past violation of the Vienna Convention with the ultimate consequence manifest-
ing itself upon the defendant's execution. Second, now that cases such as Breard
and Murphy have been decided, counsel should argue that Virginia has certainly
been put on notice of its obligations under the Vienna Convention, and any
future violations will be willful and controlling.
Finally, there is an argument to be made against Eleventh Amendment im-
munity based on the intersection of foreign policy and state action. It has been
suggested that the Court find the necessity of such an exception when a state
irreversibly interferes with federal foreign policy. 4 In not adhering to the
provisions of the Vienna Convention, the Commonwealth encroaches upon the
duties of the Executive Branch and the State Department by intruding into
federal foreign relations. Such encroachment jeopardizes United States' relations
with not only the defendant's native country, but also with all other signatory
countries of the treaty. Counsel can use the importance of amicable relations
between the United States and these countries to argue the overwhelming
necessity for this exemption to the Eleventh Amendment.
C. The Collision Between the Procedural Rules of the Supreme Court and Virginia
Each of the three justices who dissented in this case expressed great appre-
hension about the lack of time afforded the Court for deliberation on Breard's
petitions. According to the dissenting justices, this lack of time resulted directly
from the execution schedule set by the Commonwealth." Under the rules of the
Supreme Court, "a petition for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment in any
case, civil or criminal, entered by ... a United States court of appeals ... is timely
when it is filed with the Clerk of this Court within 90 days after entry of the
judgment."36 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Breard's habeas petition
on February 18, 1998. Therefore, under the Supreme Court's rules, Breard could
have properly filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the denial up until
May 18, 1998. Nonetheless, under the schedule currently utilized by the Com-
monwealth, the Commonwealth must seek an execution date from the circuit
court within 10 days of the Fourth Circuit's denial of a petitioner's writ applica-
34. See Kirgis, Zshemig v. Miller and the Breard Matter, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 704, 707 (1998).
See also Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (invalidating state probate laws permitting nonresi-
dent aliens to inherit American decedents' property only if aliens' countries recognize certain
property rights upon finding that state judges were interfering with federal foreign relations by
improperly administering these probate laws).
35. Breard, 118 S.Ct. at 1356-57 (Stevens,J., dissenting); Id at 1357 (Breycr,J., dissenting); Id
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
36. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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tion, and within 60 days the circuit court must set an execution date. 7  If the
Commonwealth faxes the request for an execution date to the circuit court, the
day after the Fourth Circuit's denial, which it is permitted to do and often does,
the circuit court could conceivably set the execution date prior to the date in
which the petitioner can file a timely petition to the United States Supreme
Court. Not only is the petitioner's right to appeal severely hampered, but the
Supreme Court itself is denied the full amount of time for consideration of the
petitioner's application as provided for by its own rules. Breard suffered from
this overlap because even though he had until May 19, 1998, to file a petition
with the Supreme Court and the Court had until that same date to review such
a petition, the Commonwealth set his execution date for April 14, 1998. For
Breard, those thirty-five days could have made the difference between a denial
and a granting of certiorari by the Court.
Breard also suggests the need to push an issue not limited to foreign nation-
als. The collision between the rules of the Supreme Court and the practices of
the Commonwealth in Breard's case is not a new phenomenon. Justices Gins-
burg and Stevens have been consistently dissenting in all Virginia capital cases on
this basis since Virginia began pursuing a speedier execution schedule nearly two
years ago.3" The addition of Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion is hopeful and
encouraging, particularly since the granting of certiorari only requires four jus-
tices' votes.
39
Counsel should give thoughtful consideration to the Brearddissents and seek
way to secure that fourth vote. For example, if counsel is confronted with a
situation similar to that of Breard, he or she could file a motion for leave of the
Court to file under the normal rules of the United States Supreme Court as
opposed to having to file a petition simply to beat the execution date set by the
Commonwealth.
The fundamental lesson of Breardis that capital counsel representing foreign
nationals must make any potential Vienna Convention claims as early as possible.
Procedural default should be avoided at all costs. Also, capital counsel should
keep in mind that the Vienna Convention places an affirmative duty upon states
to uphold the consular notification provisions. Using this affirmative duty,
counsel should argue that the state or Commonwealth has the burden of showing
37. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-232.1 (Michie 1998).
38. See, e.,., Watkins v. Angelone, 118 S.Ct. 1351 (U.S. 1998); DuBois v. Greene, 119 S.Ct.
25 (U.S. 1998).
39. Beyond the timing issue, Breyer also addressed the possibility of Breard successfully
arguing the existence of "cause" given the novelty of his claim and the existence of "prejudice"
because of the treaty violation's effect of "isolating him at a critical moment from Consular Officials
who might have advised him to try to avoid the death penalty by pleading guilty." Breard, 118 S.Ct.
at 1357 (BreyerJ., dissenting). Moreover, Breyer hypothesized success for Brcard with regard to
a Teague claim. Specifically, Breyer suggested that Breard, if victorious in arguing the novelty of his
Vienna Convention claim, should assert that the nature of his claim constitutes a ."watershed rule
of criminal procedure,"' and therefore prevail over any Teague obstacles. Id at 1357 (quoting Teague
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989)).
19981 .45
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that it did in fact satisfy all of the requirements of the treaty with regard to the
arresting of foreign nationals. The onus should not be placed upon the defen-
dant to have to prove that the state or Commonwealth afforded him all of the
rights provided by the Vienna Convention, or to prove in advance how he is
prejudiced by the denial of those requirements.
The controversy surrounding the execution of foreign nationals in the
United States has intensified in recent years.4" Defense counsel should use this
controversy and the resulting publicity to its tactical advantage in negotiating with
prosecutors. For it is no longer simply capital defense counsel opposing the
Commonwealth's continuous violations of the Vienna Convention, but also the
International Court of Justice, foreign countries and at least three United States
Supreme Court justices.
Mary K. Martin
40. See Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97 (4th Cit. 1997).
[Vol. H1: I
